Andreas Gernert is Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations at KLU. Prior to joining KLU, Andreas was a post-doctoral researcher in the Technology and Operations Management Area at INSEAD. He obtained his Ph.D. at the EBS University in the Institute for Supply Chain Management and his M.Sc. in mathematics at Ulm University.
Andreas' current research examines policies, business models and strategies pertaining to the three dimensions of sustainability - environmental, social and economic. In this realm, he utilizes Game Theory and Optimization (i) to characterize policies that reduce modern slavery in the agricultural sector, (ii) to identify profitable and impactful business models for entrepreneurs in developing countries' emergency management systems, and (iii) to study different supportive strategies to mitigate financial distress in supply chains. His research has been published in the Decision Sciences.
Andreas teaches Operations Management and Sustainable Supply Chain Management. To facilitate the students' learning experience, Andreas utilizes interactive and student-centered teaching methods such as case study discussion and Socratic questioning.
Academic Positions
Since 1/2022 | Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations, Kühne Logistics University, Hamburg, Germany |
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| 2020 - 2021 | Post-doctoral Researcher, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France |
2015 - 2019 | Research Assistant, EBS University, Wiesbaden, Germany |
Education
| 2016 - 2019 | Doctorate, EBS University, Wiesbaden, Germany |
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| 2011 - 2013 | Master of Science in Mathematics, University of Ulm, Ulm, Germany |
| 2007 - 2011 | Bachelor of Science in Mathematics, University of Ulm, Ulm, Germany |
Professional Experience
| 2016 | Procurement Management, Airbus, Hamburg, Germany |
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2014 - 2015 | Game Designer and Monetization Specialist, Gameforge AG, Hamburg, Germany |
- Gernert, Andreas K., Calmon, A. P., Romero, G., Wuttke, D. A. (2021): Coordinate or Compete in a Market with Fragmented Supply. INFORMS Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, USA.
- Gernert, Andreas K., Calmon, A. P., Iancu, D. A., Wuttke, D. A. (2021): Addressing Child Labor and Deforestation in the Cocoa Sector. INFORMs Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, USA.
- Wuttke, D. A., Gernert, A. K., Heese, H. S. (2019): Sourcing Decisions with a Financially Distressed Supplier. POMS Conference, Washington, DC, USA.
- Gernert, A. K. (2018): The Effects of Taxes on Education, Labor, and Rent-Seeking. Annual Session of the IOEA, Cargèse, France.
- Gernert, A. K., Heese, H. S., Wuttke, D. A. (2017): Outsourcing New Product Development Projects: Development before Commitment or Commitment before Development? INFORMS Annual Meeting, Houston, TX, USA.
Publications
Gernert, Andreas K., H. Sebastian Heese and David A. Wuttke (2021): Subcontracting New Product Development Projects: The Role of Competition and Commitment, Decision Sciences, 52 (5): 1039-1070.
Abstract: Should a firm, which seeks to subcontract a new product development project, leverage competition among potential suppliers and ask all of them to engage in research and development in parallel? Or should it first invite offers and commit to the supplier with the best offer, before only this supplier engages in development? Building on analytical literature on both formats, we apply game theory to answer these questions. We identify Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies and characterize advantages of both formats. We find that having multiple suppliers engage in new product development in parallel is favored only if enough suppliers can be attracted, which is the case when development uncertainty and learning benefits are high. The participation decision also depends on the specific structure of the project's development costs. If administrative overhead and material costs are substantial, while engaging in development and exerting effort is relatively cheap but does not offer many learning opportunities, the number of suppliers who would be willing to engage in parallel development is limited. First inviting offers and selecting the best supplier to exclusively engage in new product development then becomes more attractive for the buyer. We discuss further implications and characterize environments that may foster more innovativeness in this context.