Prof. Dr. Andreas K. Gernert

Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations

Prof. Dr. Andreas K. Gernert

Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations

Andreas Gernert is Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations at KLU. Prior to joining KLU, Andreas was a post-doctoral researcher in the Technology and Operations Management Area at INSEAD. He obtained his Ph.D. at the EBS University in the Institute for Supply Chain Management and his M.Sc. in mathematics at Ulm University.

Andreas' current research examines policies, business models and strategies pertaining to the three dimensions of sustainability - environmental, social and economic. In this realm, he utilizes Game Theory and Optimization (i) to characterize policies that reduce modern slavery in the agricultural sector, (ii) to identify profitable and impactful business models for entrepreneurs in developing countries' emergency management systems, and (iii) to study different supportive strategies to mitigate financial distress in supply chains. His research has been published in the Decision Sciences.   

Andreas teaches Operations Management and Sustainable Supply Chain Management. To facilitate the students' learning experience, Andreas utilizes interactive and student-centered teaching methods such as case study discussion and Socratic questioning.  

Academic Positions

Since 1/2022

Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations, Kühne Logistics University, Hamburg, Germany
2020 - 2021

Post-doctoral Researcher, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

2015 - 2019

Research Assistant, EBS University, Wiesbaden, Germany

Education

2016 -  2019

Doctorate, EBS University, Wiesbaden, Germany

2011 - 2013

Master of Science in Mathematics, University of Ulm, Ulm, Germany

2007 - 2011Bachelor of Science in Mathematics, University of Ulm, Ulm, Germany

Professional Experience

2016Procurement Management, Airbus, Hamburg, Germany

2014  - 2015

Game Designer and Monetization Specialist, Gameforge AG, Hamburg, Germany
  • Gernert, Andreas K., Calmon, A. P., Romero, G., Wuttke, D. A. (2021): Coordinate or Compete in a Market with Fragmented Supply. INFORMS Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, USA.
  • Gernert, Andreas K., Calmon, A. P., Iancu, D. A., Wuttke, D. A. (2021): Addressing Child Labor and Deforestation in the Cocoa Sector. INFORMs Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, USA.
  • Wuttke, D. A., Gernert, A. K., Heese, H. S. (2019): Sourcing Decisions with a Financially Distressed Supplier. POMS Conference, Washington, DC, USA.
  • Gernert, A. K. (2018): The Effects of Taxes on Education, Labor, and Rent-Seeking. Annual Session of the IOEA, Cargèse, France.
  • Gernert, A. K., Heese, H. S., Wuttke, D. A. (2017): Outsourcing New Product Development Projects: Development before Commitment or Commitment before Development? INFORMS Annual Meeting, Houston, TX, USA.

Publications

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2022.108584 

Abstract: In the pharmaceutical industry, personalized medicine is increasingly replacing the traditional blockbuster drug concept. Personalized medicine consists of a targeted drug that is only prescribed if a companion diagnostic test detects the corresponding biomarker. This concept promises improved treatments of various diseases. However, personalized medicine also presents pharmaceutical firms with new challenges resulting from interdependencies in the drug and diagnostic test development processes. Although pharmaceutical firms generally benefit from competition among diagnostic firms, the threat of substitutes from competitors could cause diagnostic firms to step back from new product development in the first place, leading to lost revenues for the pharmaceutical firm. We consider a pharmaceutical firm that may inform two competing differentiated diagnostic firms about a drug under development, such that these firms can develop a corresponding diagnostic test. We show which diagnostic firm the pharmaceutical firm should inform first and how granting early exclusivity to a single diagnostic firm can maximize pharmaceutical profits from personalized medicine.

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Open reference in new window "Pricing and market entry decisions in personalized medicine"

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/deci.12484 

Abstract: Should a firm, which seeks to subcontract a new product development project, leverage competition among potential suppliers and ask all of them to engage in research and development in parallel? Or should it first invite offers and commit to the supplier with the best offer, before only this supplier engages in development? Building on analytical literature on both formats, we apply game theory to answer these questions. We identify Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies and characterize advantages of both formats. We find that having multiple suppliers engage in new product development in parallel is favored only if enough suppliers can be attracted, which is the case when development uncertainty and learning benefits are high. The participation decision also depends on the specific structure of the project's development costs. If administrative overhead and material costs are substantial, while engaging in development and exerting effort is relatively cheap but does not offer many learning opportunities, the number of suppliers who would be willing to engage in parallel development is limited. First inviting offers and selecting the best supplier to exclusively engage in new product development then becomes more attractive for the buyer. We discuss further implications and characterize environments that may foster more innovativeness in this context.

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Open reference in new window "Subcontracting New Product Development Projects: The Role of Competition and Commitment"