Lang, Günter and Peter Welzel

Budgetdefizite, Wahlzyklen und Geldpolitik: Empirische Ergebnisse für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1962 - 1989

Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 210 (1-2): 85-72, (1992).

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Abstract: New empirical evidence on the factual as opposed to the formal independence of the Deutsche Bundesbank is presented. Estimating monetary reaction functions for the Federal Republic of Germany we try to identify a direct influence of electoral cycles and an indirect influence of government deficits on monetary policy. Whereas there are clear indications for the indirect mechanism, the data does not show a direct influence as long as the model is specified with Nordhaus-cycles. Using the more recent rational partisan theory, however, yields evidence for a relationship between election dates, election outcomes, and money supply changes.

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